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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The world is aging, with the workforce starting to shrink in several countries, and 
productivity growth is still struggling ten years after the global financial crisis (and monetary 
and fiscal policies already at their limits in many countries). Structural reforms—that aim to 
enhance competition and flexibility in product and labor markets, among other objectives 
targeting government efficiency and transparency—seem to be the most promising policy 
option to revive productivity growth and maintain or continue to increase living standards 
(IMF, 2015). A related call is for improving financial inclusion—in particular, access to 
finance—so that productivity-enhancing innovation (sometimes in the form of entry by new 
firms into an industry) and other investment can be financed (Furusawa, 2016). 
In the pursuit for faster productivity growth, economic regulation aspires to achieve a 
competitive environment that fosters efficiency and innovation. Competition is often seen as 
a driver of productivity, and competition matters not only for the efficiency of production but 
also for the quality of products and the degree of innovation in industries—notwithstanding 
the fact that these relationships, both in theory and practice, tend to display an inverted U-
shape (see Aghion et al., 2005, and the references therein). Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) 
argue that competition is an important determinant of a sector’s capital allocation which 
contributes to overall economic growth. Bhuyan (2005) also discusses whether competition 
can positively affect allocative efficiency because it helps convergence of market equilibrium 
to that when maximum efficiency is achieved (i.e., prices set equal to marginal costs).  
Economic regulation targets competition primarily through rules that limit who can enter a 
business.1 Setting clear and coherent entry regulations would generate information and screen 
out potential frauds and cheats (e.g., Klapper et al., 2006), but going excessive may hamper 
competitiveness and thus hinder economic growth (e.g., Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2014). 
Entry regulations vary widely across countries (as do industrial competition and growth 
performance). For example, to meet government requirements for starting a business in 
Brazil, an entrepreneur must complete 11 procedures taking at least 80 business days with a 
cost of 5.2 percent of income per capita.2 In contrast, to form a new business, an entrepreneur 
in New Zealand has to complete only 1 procedure that takes just 1 day with a much lower 
cost of 0.3 percent of income per capita. On average, entrepreneurs in emerging markets need 
to follow around 9 procedures and wait for around 31 days bearing a cost of 14 percent of 
income per capita, but these figures are considerably lower for their peers in advanced 
economies (5 procedures, 8-day processing, at a cost of 8 percent of income per capita).   
In addition, access to finance is a vital component for new firms and those seeking to 
innovate, and the lack thereof can become a barrier to entry. The latter is likely to be the case 
                                                 
1 There is a great degree of consensus that the other tool for economic regulation, namely price controls, should 
be confined to situations where temporary use of controls may be effective in easing the transition from a high 
to low inflation (Rockoff, 2008).  
2 Based on the most recent round of data collection (completed in June 2016) for the Doing Business project of 
the World Bank. 
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if regulatory features governing access to finance—such as legal protection of lending 
relations or availability of information on credit histories—are inadequate. A growing 
literature on institutions, finance, and economic growth indeed highlight the role of access to 
finance and the regulatory features that govern it (Aghion et al., 2007). These features also 
vary across countries. For example, while the strength of legal rights and the depth of credit 
information scores are high in New Zealand (based on the Doing Business index), they are 
very low in Jordan. In general, the index values tend to be lower in emerging markets as 
compared to advanced economies.   
In this paper, we empirically investigate the extent to which differences in market entry and 
credit access regulation across countries explain differences in industry competition. We 
focus on these two factors, since rigid entry regulations and poor access to credit are likely to 
make it harder for prospective entrepreneurs to start operating and to gain competitive 
advantage over existing firms.  
The dataset covers 28 industries across 64 countries over the period 2004–10. In the 
empirical specification, we focus on cross-industry, cross-country interaction effects. 
specifically, we explore whether competition is lower in industries with a higher “natural” 
propensity for entry (Klapper et al., 2006) when the country has higher hurdles for business 
incorporation and whether competition is lower in industries with more reliance on external 
finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) when the country has regulations making it more difficult 
to get credit. The methodology has the advantage of addressing several issues that plague 
cross-country regressions—such as reverse causality (e.g., countries with more competitive 
industries may choose more business-friendly regulations) or omitted variable bias (e.g., a 
country with good institutions may score well in a range of indicators including the degree of 
competition and the extent of bureaucracy). By focusing on interactions, we can absorb 
country-level variables and instead study the differential effects of country-level variables we 
are interested in across industries that might be most responsive to these variables.3 
Our primary measure for competition is the price-cost margin (PCM). 4  The presence of 
significant cross-country differences in regulations of business entry and access to finance as 
well as the presence of significant cross-industry differences in PCM allow exploration of the 
relationship between regulation and competition. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to do so. The study of market competition captured by PCM can help one 
understand the differential implications of changes in regulations across industrial sectors. As 
an alternative measure of competition, we also look at the average firm size (AFS). 
                                                 
3 The disadvantage is that we cannot compute the overall magnitude of these effects but only the relative 
magnitude on the industries examined. 
4 The price-cost margin (PCM) captures competition based on the reasoning that changes in regulations affect 
entry barriers and, hence, the number of firms, and this, in turn, influences the mark-up of price over marginal 
costs. See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) for further explanation of this mechanism. Alesina et al. (2005) also 
argue that regulation can influence the costs that even existing firms face when expanding their investment 
capacity. Moreover, Egger and Egger (2004) show that price-cost margins are closely related to other measures 
of competition. Our choice of PCM over other competition measures is primarily driven by simplicity and data 
availability (that we can compute it directly using industry-level data, without resorting to firm-level data).         
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While manufacturing sectors in countries such as Denmark, Germany, and Israel are highly 
competitive (i.e., PCMs close to 0), they are less competitive in countries like Colombia, 
Indonesia, and Korea (i.e., high PCMs). Our empirical analysis essentially explores what 
might account for these differences. Among several potential factors, we focus on market-
entry regulations (i.e., procedural burden, time, and costs of starting a business) and access to 
finance (i.e., strength of legal rights and depth of credit information).5 These two regulatory 
dimensions have been reported to explain variations in the business environment in terms of 
competition using other measures and country-level data (e.g., Black and Strahan, 2002; Di 
Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004), but industry-level data have not been explored. 
Our empirical analysis delivers the following results. Bureaucratic and costly entry 
regulations hamper competition in industries, and the effect is much stronger where there is a 
relatively high level of entry. When the regression model is re-estimated with AFS as an 
alternative dependent variable, we find a positive relationship between entry regulations and 
AFS. This implies that stricter regulations are also associated with larger AFS, possibly 
contributing to the process of concentration in industrial sectors. Our evidence seems to favor 
the public choice theory over the public interest theory of regulation in accordance with that 
presented in Djankov et al. (2002).6 This implies that incumbent firms are likely to expand 
their market share when there are stricter regulations in place. We also find that credit 
information registries and collateral and bankruptcy laws protecting creditor rights appear to 
reduce PCM and AFS in industries that rely heavily on external finance. These findings 
suggest that improving access to finance is likely to enhance competition. The direction of 
the relationship likely runs from regulations to competition, given the differential results in 
industries that have a relatively high level of entry and that benefit more from improved 
access to finance. This interpretation is further supported by instrumental variables 
regressions and regressions run on subsamples of industries that are less likely to be able to 
affect regulations and, hence, the case for reverse causality is weaker. 
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section II reviews the 
literature and clarifies the contributions of the paper. Section III introduces a simple 
conceptual setup to describe the relationship between industry structure and competition, and 
then specifies the empirical model used. Section IV is dedicated to the data and descriptive 
analysis. In Section V, we present the empirical results. Section VI concludes. 
                                                 
5 Business regulations data are retrieved from the Doing Business project of the World Bank. The project 
classifies regulations under the following categories: starting a business; getting credit; registering property; 
protecting investors; enforcing contracts; paying taxes; resolving insolvency; dealing with construction; getting 
electricity and trading across borders. We focus on the first two categories (starting a business and getting 
credit), which are closely associated with entry regulations and, arguably, have more influence on competition. 
As Kalyvas and Mamatzakis (2014) assert, the Doing Business data are highly decomposed and, hence, have 
advantages over alternative measures of business regulations, such as economic freedom. 
6 See Section II for the detailed discussion of public choice theory and public interest theory. 
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II.   RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A.   Related Literature 
Our paper connects two strands of existing literature. One deals with the effect of product 
market regulation on productivity (and other economic outcomes). The other investigates the 
relationship between productivity and competition. In terms of the literature on the former, 
for instance, Buis et al. (2016) examine the economic effects of major product market 
reforms using a unique mapping between new annual data on reform shocks and sector-level 
outcomes for five network industries in 26 countries spanning over three decades. They find 
that major reductions in barriers to entry yield large increases in output and labor 
productivity. Similar studies using country-time or country-time-industry panel data 
document a significant positive effect of product market reform on productivity, investment, 
employment, and output (see, for instance, Aghion et al., 2009; Alesina et al., 2005; 
Bassanini and Duval, 2009; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). Furthermore, Duval and Furceri 
(2016) apply a local projection method to a new dataset of major country- and country-
sector-level reform shocks in various areas of labor market institutions and product market 
regulation covering 26 advanced economies. Product market reforms are found to raise 
productivity and output. The impact of labor market reforms is primarily on employment, but 
it varies across types of reforms and depends on overall business cycle conditions. Gal and 
Hijzen (2016) also contribute to the emerging literature on the effects of product market 
reforms by providing a comprehensive analysis for 10 regulated industries in three broad 
sectors (network industries, retail trade, and professional services) across 18 advanced 
economies during the period 1998–2013. They find that the effects of product market reforms 
on output and investment are positive in the short term and strengthen over time.    
 
Turning to the literature on the relationship between productivity and competition, there is 
evidence that competition—and policies affecting it—is an important determinant of 
productivity growth. Firm-level evidence has supported the idea that competitive pressures 
are a driver of productivity-enhancing innovation and adoption (e.g., Griffith et al., 2002; 
Haskel et al., 2007; Aghion et al., 2004). Further evidence has also been provided at the 
industry level (e.g., Inklaar et al., 2008; Buccirossi et al., 2009). Bourles et al. (2013) argue 
that regulations that bridle access to otherwise competitive markets and unnecessarily 
constrain business operations can be a drag on productivity growth. They further assert that 
such regulations can also have powerful indirect depressing effects on the productivity of 
other sectors through input-output linkages and label regulations such as legal barriers to 
entry as “anticompetitive upstream regulations.”    
 
To sum, these studies empirically find that there is a positive relationship between product 
market reform and productivity, and also between productivity and competition. Our paper 
complements these studies by filling a gap through direct investigation of the relationship 
between market regulations and competition.   
 
Our paper also contributes to the following three strands of the literature. First, it is closely 
related to those studies that document market-entry regulations as barriers to 
entrepreneurship. Desai et al. (2003) and Klapper et al. (2006) find that market-entry 
regulations have a negative impact on firm formation. Using firm-level data from 10 OECD 
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countries, Scarpetta et al. (2002) also show a negative correlation between strict product-
market regulations and the entry of small and medium-sized enterprises. For instance, if entry 
costs are fixed at a high level, then this would increase the average size of entrants. Fisman 
and Sarria-Allende (2010) document that existing firms within industries will expand fast if 
they are located in countries with strict entry regulations. They also show that new firm 
creation is limited under such circumstances.  
 
Second, our paper is related to literature that focuses on the economic impact of financial 
development and access to finance. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that a well-developed 
financial system enhances competition in industrial sectors by allowing easier entry. They 
present the basic mechanism showing that the correlation between credit allocation and a 
borrower’s collateral and reputation falls as a financial system develops. This increases the 
entry of new, unknown (potentially more innovative) firms, improving the degree of 
competition and thus reducing the rent of incumbents. De Serres et al. (2006) also find that 
regulations that improve efficiency and stability of financial systems increase the rate of 
entry of new firms. In Cetorelli (2004), enhanced bank competition in the United States is 
associated with more firms in operation with a smaller average firm size. In a seminal paper, 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) distinguish industries between the heavy users of external finance 
and the lighter users of external finance and find that industries that rely more on external 
finance grow disproportionately faster in financially developed countries. Similarly, Klapper 
et al. (2006) show that, in Europe, financial development facilitates entry in the sectors that 
are more dependent on external finance. Using firm-level data in 16 advanced and emerging 
economies, Aghion et al. (2007) also support the finding of Rajan and Zingales (1998) by 
arguing that financial development encourages entry by small firms to the sectors that are 
heavy users of external finance. Empirical evidence, in general, appears to suggest that small 
firms are more sensitive to financial development, since they are prone to credit constraints 
(Beck et al., 2004).     
Third, this paper is linked to the literature that attempts to measure determinants of 
competition in industrial sectors. Determinants of product market competition have been 
analyzed in many studies (e.g., Chevalier, 1995; Kovenock and Phillips, 1995 and 1997; 
Maksimovic, 1988). Others have particularly focused on determinants of firm size (e.g., 
Kumar et al., 2001; Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006).        
Our paper relates to these parallel lines of research and makes a contribution by 
distinguishing itself from previous empirical studies in two ways. First, we explore, for the 
first time to the best of our knowledge in the literature dealing with manufacturing sectors, 
the implications of country-wide regulations related to starting a business and credit access 
for industry competition using industry-level data. We use a relatively large dataset of 28 
industries in 64 countries, that includes an entire range of listed and non-listed firms within 
each industry. Second, we exploit the heterogeneity in the relationship between regulations 
and competition across industries based on their varying degrees of market-entry rates and 
external-finance dependence. This helps us take a step toward identifying the causal effect of 
business regulations on competition. We conduct several exercises to establish the link better, 
including instrumental variables regressions and subsamples.  
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B.   Theoretical Considerations  
Our main research question can be formulated as: what is the association between market-
entry regulations and competition? There are two competing theories.   
First is the public interest theory of regulation (Pigou, 1938), which suggests that stricter 
regulation of entry should be associated with socially superior outcomes. Entry regulations 
ensure that companies meet minimum standards to provide goods and services while limiting 
market power (e.g., formation of monopolies). Under this theory, one would expect that entry 
regulation is associated with high-quality products from “desirable” sellers and fewer 
externalities such as pollution (Arrunada, 2007), and with maintaining a “healthy” degree of 
competition.   
The opposing theory is the public choice theory (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976), which 
comes in two flavors. The capture theory by Stigler (1971) argues that regulation is acquired 
by the industry and primarily designed for its own benefit. Stigler predicts that stricter 
regulation raises barriers to entry, leading to greater market power and profits for firms, 
rather than benefits to consumers. The strict regulation of entry keeps out the competitors and 
raises rents for incumbents and it is susceptible to corruption (Djankov et al., 2002).  
Acemoglu (2008) argues, in a variation of the capture theory, that political power is in the 
hands of major firms who try to block new entrepreneurs. The second strand of the public 
choice theory, the so-called ‘tollbooth view’ (Djankov et al., 2002) holds that regulation is 
pursued for the benefit of politicians in order to create rents or to extract them through 
campaign contributions, votes, and bribes.   
We hypothesize in light of the public choice theory that stiffer entry regulations should be 
associated with less competition. Evidence on the contrary would be interpreted as support 
for the public interest theory. 
Credit constraints also play their part as entry barriers, as discussed in many studies including 
Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003). Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Clementi and 
Hopenhayn (2006), and Cabral and Mata (2003) develop models in which financial 
constraints severely limit entry as well as post-entry growth of firms. Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989) argue that liquidity constraints may prevent investors from starting a business, 
suggesting that entry rates should be lower in countries where access to finance is difficult. 
Empirical studies by Klapper et al. (2006) and Aghion et al. (2007) confirm that financial 
constraints are detrimental to firm market entry and growth. One might argue that 
beneficiaries of highly developed financial markets are the incumbent firms: they get more 
funds than new entrants do, which can in turn reduce competition. However, highly 
developed markets are likely to provide better access to finance for new entrants than less 
developed markets can. So, in a cross-country context, we expect onerous entry regulations 
together with lower financial development to generate an unfavorable business environment, 
and a relaxation of barriers to entry and better access to credit to increase competition within 
industrial sectors.  
Note that we use industry data for computing price-cost margins, because the implications of 
entry regulations and credit access for industry competition may vary across industries (see 
Braun and Raddatz, 2008). For instance, while, in some industries, technological constraints 
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(e.g., a minimum efficient scale) may be the main obstacle to competition, in other industries 
access to finance may be more important as a constraint. Thus, incumbents may behave 
differently when they face lax entry regulations and/or easier access to credit. Braun and 
Raddatz (2008) present empirical evidence that the impact of financial development on 
competition, measured by price-cost margins and average firm size, is heterogeneous across 
industries. Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that industries that are more dependent on external 
finance grow disproportionately faster if they are located in countries with more developed 
financial markets. Cetorelli (2001), Cetorelli (2004), and Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) also 
document the heterogeneous impact of financial development on manufacturing industries. In 
our empirical analysis, we consider heterogeneity from the aspect of entry rates and external-
finance dependence that vary across industrial sectors.  
III.   METHODOLOGY 
A.   Industry Structure, Competition, and Price-Cost Margin  
Consider an industry with 𝑁 firms and an inverse demand curve given by 𝑝 = 𝑓(𝑋), where X 
is the market output and is computed as the sum of the outputs of the firms, i.e., ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 .  
Assume that the firms produce a homogenous product and each firm has the (same) cost 
function that includes a fixed cost 𝑐𝑖
𝑓
 and a constant variable cost 𝑐𝑖
𝑣(𝑥𝑖).  Then the profit 
function for the 𝑖th firm is: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑣(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑐𝑖
𝑓
                                                       (1𝑎) 
where 𝜋𝑖is profit, 𝑥𝑖 is output rate, and 𝑝 is price. Rearranging this equation, we obtain: 
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑋)𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖
𝑣(𝑥𝑖) − 𝑐𝑖
𝑓
                                                    (1𝑏)  
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= 1 + 𝜏𝑖, a variety of 
competitive behavior can be presented. Here 𝜏𝑖 is the expected changes in the output of rivals 
for a given change in the output of firm 𝑖. Then 𝜏𝑖 > 0 indicates collusive behavior. If all 
firms tend to increase their output, then we have 𝜏𝑖 =
1−𝑠𝑖
𝑠𝑖
, where 𝑠𝑖 is the market share of 
firm 𝑖, indicating full collusion with all firms changing outputs so as to preserve market 
shares. The Nash-Cornet case has 𝜏𝑖 = 0, while 𝜏𝑖 < 0 is competitive. 
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where ∑ 𝑠𝑖 = 1.  Note that the left-hand side of Eq. (2b) represents price-cost margin or the 
Lerner index (the mark-up of price over marginal cost) of monopoly power (Cowling and 
Waterson, 1976), which is inversely associated with the industry price elasticity and with the 
number of firms in the industry. Also note that Waterson (1984) shows how price-cost 
margins can be aggregated over firms and be related to industry concentration. 
From this equation, we can conjecture that stricter market entry regulation or poorer access to 
finance will decrease the number of firms (𝑁) in each industry and, hence, increase price-cost 
margins. For example, with better access to finance, new firms will be created, implying that 
𝑁 rises and price-cost margins fall.    
B.   Empirical Specifications 
In line with previous studies (e.g., Braun and Raddatz, 2008), we estimate the following 
regression models: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡
= 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡
+ ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                                                                     (3𝑎) 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡
= 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑3𝑌𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + ∅𝑐 + 𝜗𝑡
+ 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                                                                  (3𝑏) 
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where 𝑖, 𝑐, and 𝑡 denote industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. As to be explained further below, 
the first specification includes a rich set of interaction fixed effects. Note that the pair-fixed 
effects (industry-country, industry-time, and country-time) would absorb all the single fixed 
effects (industry, country and time). The second specification drops the interaction between 
country and time fixed effects so as to allow inclusion of individual fixed effects as well as 
control variables that vary at the country-time dimension.7 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is product market competition at the industry level measured using the price-
cost margin (PCM).8 This measure captures the ability of firms in an industry to set prices 
above marginal costs.9,10 PCM is computed using proxies for sales and costs, as available in 
industry data, as follows (Braun and Raddatz, 2008): 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 (𝑃𝐶𝑀) =
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 − 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
=
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 − 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
                                                              (4) 
We also use average firm size (AFS) as an alternative dependent variable (Cetorelli and 
Strahan, 2006). Following Cetorelli (2001), AFS is similarly measured using the available 
proxies, namely, by the ratio of total employment to the total number of establishments. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 stands for the two categories of business regulations we consider in the analysis. 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 is a composite measure of market entry regulations by taking a principal 
component of four elements: procedure, time, cost, and capital. 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  depicts 
regulations with direct implications on availability of finance, where we also take a principal 
component of four elements: strength, depth, public, and private. Section IV and Table 1 
provide further details on each of these components.  
                                                 
7 The first, more restrictive specification is our baseline (following Levintal, 2013). 
8 Several other studies also use price-cost margin as an indicator of industry competition. See, for example, 
Cowling and Waterson (1976), Bhuyan (2005), Dickson (2005), Egger and Egger (2004), Braun and Raddatz 
(2008), Boulhol (2008), and Stiegert et al. (2009).  
9 Note that PCM as computed here differs from the original formulation of the Lerner index of monopoly 
power, outlined in Section III.A, which uses marginal rather than average costs and assumes the industry is in 
equilibrium. In our context, this is not too worrisome since we will not be driving inferences based on the level 
of PCM but will just use its within-country, cross-industry variation. Also, industry-level PCM in practice is a 
measure of the profitability of incumbents, calculated as profit over value of total output. One could think of a 
variety of refinements including adjustments for capital investment and taxes. We go for the simple version of 
the indicator due to data availability. 
10 Fluctuations in PCM could be due to changes in demand rather than market structure. Yet, the sensitivity of 
margins to aggregate demand would again differ between concentrated and un-concentrated industries. 
Domowitz et al. (1986) show that the observed concentration-margins relationship is independent of the 
business cycle. They find that industry price-cost margins respond positively to increases in demand in 
concentrated industries, i.e., increasing concentration is associated with margins that are more procyclical. In 
our empirical specification, country-time fixed effects aim to capture demand-related changes.           
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The implications of business regulations for competition are not, however, homogeneous 
across industries. In the empirical specifications, we exploit this heterogeneity as an 
identification strategy. Particularly, we distinguish industries with a relatively high entry rate 
and also industries with a relatively heavy dependence on external finance from other 
industries. Hence, 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is either the industry entry rate (𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) or external-
finance dependence (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒). The logic for the first is as follows 
(Klapper et al., 2006): if rigid market-entry requirements have an impact on industry 
competition, they should particularly hamper entry into industries that have naturally high 
entry rates. Klapper et al. (2006) compute entry rates of new firms for the United States by 
two-digit NACE industry codes taking the fraction of new firms to total number of firms in 
an industry. New firms are defined as a firm that is one or two years old. The data were 
averaged for the years 1998–99. We use their data by matching the two-digit NACE with 
three-digit ISIC (see Section IV for details). As for the second industry characteristic, we 
follow Rajan and Zingales (1998). Using U.S. firm-level data, they estimate external-finance 
dependence of each industry. We expect that, if access to credit matters for industry PCM, it 
should be more pronounced for industries that are more dependent on external finance.11 
𝑋 and 𝑌 are vectors of industry-country-year and country-year control variables, respectively. 
Here, we consider several industry-specific and country-specific variables that may explain 
differences in PCM across industries and countries. First, we include a proxy for industry 
market share. We expect that industries with a larger market share have a better position in 
setting prices above marginal costs. As a proxy for market share, we use the share of value 
added of each industry to total value added of all industries in the country (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998). Second, we consider two proxies for industry inefficiency and productivity. 
The former is the ratio of each industry’s wages to output, and the latter is the ratio of value 
added growth to number of employees in each industry.12 Note that, to mitigate the concern 
that these measures computed at the industry level may be affected by the degree of 
competition in the same industry and, hence, generate endogeneity, we use lagged values of 
these variables. Third, PCM has been shown to be positively correlated with measures of 
concentration across industries (e.g., Collins and Preston, 1969; Encaoua and Jacquemin, 
1980; Braun and Raddatz, 2008). For instance, Collins and Preston (1969) find that there is a 
strong relationship between four-firm concentration and inter-industry differences in PCM. 
Given unavailability of proxies for concentration data across individual industries for each 
country, we use the share of value added of the top five largest industries in each country.13 
Fourth, capital intensity varies across industries and hence industries may respond differently 
                                                 
11 The external-finance dependence measure is calculated by pooling all—both young and mature—firms in an 
industry. One could argue that the calculations for young firms may be contaminated by factors other than their 
dependence on external finance and one should use the calculations for mature firms only. The empirical results 
are robust to computing the external-finance dependence measure using data for mature firms. 
12 Note that many other industry characteristics, such as industry differences in capital intensity, fixed costs, 
risk, vertical integration, advertising and demand elasticity, also have a bearing on price-cost margins (Collins 
and Preston, 1969). However, it is difficult to quantify such factors in a panel data analysis given the lack of 
consistent, readily-available data across sectors and over time. Nonetheless, industry fixed effects (𝜃) capture 
the impact of such factors, to the extent that they are time-invariant. 
13  Do and Levchenko (2007) use a similar approach to compute the top two sectors’ share of overall 
manufacturing exports in each country. 
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whether capital is abundant or not. Foreign direct investment could be a proxy for capital 
abundance conditions in a country.14 Finally, changes in consumer demand for an industry's 
output can be captured, albeit broadly, by macroeconomic fluctuations. Hence, we include 
GDP growth and inflation in our empirical specifications to capture such shifts in demand.  
Variation in the data also allows us to include industry-country, industry-year, and country-
year fixed effects (except when country-level control variables mentioned above are among 
the regressors). By including this rich set of fixed effects, we mitigate, to a greater degree, 
the risk of potential reverse causality and/or omitted variables (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006). 
Note the full set of the interaction fixed effects account for the impact of the global financial 
crisis that began in 2007–08. 
IV.   DATA 
We obtain our industry-level data from the UNIDO Industry Statistics. The database contains 
yearly data at 2-, 3-, and 4-digit sectors. We work with 2- and 3-digit sectors and re-group 
them into 28 sectors according to ISIC Rev.2. We compute competition indicators (PCM and 
AFS) for each of the 28 sectors in 64 countries following the definitions in Section III.B.   
Data on business regulations (starting a business and getting credit) are obtained from the 
Doing Business project of the World Bank. 15  The Doing Business project records all 
procedures officially required, or commonly carried out in practice, for an entrepreneur to 
start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business as well as the time and 
cost to complete these procedures and the paid-in minimum capital requirement. The 
procedures include obtaining all necessary licenses and permits and completing any required 
notifications, verifications or inscriptions for the company and employees with relevant 
authorities. We use four measures of regulation on starting a business: the number of 
procedures that firms must go through (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑒), the official time required completing 
the process (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒), cost required completing each procedure (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡), and the amount of 
capital that the entrepreneur needs to deposit (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙). We generate an overall composite 
index as a principal component of these four entry regulation variables 
(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠).16 
With respect to getting credit, the project measures the legal rights of borrowers and 
lenders with respect to secured transactions through one set of indicators and the sharing of 
credit information through another. The first set of indicators measures whether certain 
features that facilitate lending exist within the applicable collateral and bankruptcy laws. The 
                                                 
14  We interpret a high level of FDI as an indication that industries—especially those with high capital 
intensity—have an easier time procuring capital to engage in production activities. Domestic credit to the 
private sector—as a proxy for financial development—can be considered as an alternative, however, there is a 
high correlation between this variable and the variables measuring access to credit. 
15 We refer the interested reader to the World Bank, Doing Business website (www.doingbusiness.org). See 
Pinheiro-Alves and Zambujal-Oliveira (2012) for a discussion on the reliability of and further details on this 
dataset.   
16 Conversion of correlated variables into an index using principal component analysis is common in the 
literature. For example, see Creel et al. (2015) who construct a financial stability index. 
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second set measures the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available 
through public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Specifically, we use four measures 
of credit regulations: an index that measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy 
laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ), an 
index that measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of 
credit information available (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ), the number of individuals and firms listed in a public 
credit registry with information on their borrowing history from the past five years (𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐), 
and the number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on 
their borrowing history from the past five years (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒). A higher value of these indicators 
implies better access to finance for new firms. Again, we generate an overall index as a 
principal component of these four variables (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒).   
Table 1 describes all the variables used in this study and provides the sources from which 
they are retrieved. The sample period is 2004−10 for all variables, except for industry 
characteristics that are time-invariant. The data starts from 2004 because Doing Business 
data starts from 2004 and it ends with 2010 because industry data is available up to 2010 due 
to a lag of several years in the UNIDO data.   
Table 2a shows the country-level averages for the computed Competition indicators—PCM 
and AFS—as well as the indicators of Starting business and Access finance. Table 2b presents 
industry competition indicators and characteristics—Entry rate and External Finance 
Dependence—, taking the average across countries for each industry. Table 2c reports the 
summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis. PCM varies substantially across 
countries as well as across industries. In country-wise statistics, it ranges from around 0 in 
Israel, Denmark, and Slovenia to 0.337 in Colombia with a cross-country average of 0.118. 
In industry-wise statistics, it ranges from 0.060 in leather and fur products (ISIC 323) to 
0.265 in tobacco (ISIC 314). AFS ranges from 1.90 in Cyprus to 7.07 in Peru across 
countries, and from 2.47 in other manufacturing (ISIC 390) to 5.26 in tobacco (ISIC 314) 
across industries. 
The number of procedures required to start a business varies from the lowest of 1.71 in 
Canada and New Zealand to the highest of 16 in Brazil in Table 2a. The minimum official 
time ranges from the lowest of 2.0 business days in Australia to the highest of as many as 
146 days in Brazil. The official cost of following these procedures for an entrepreneur is 0.0 
percent of per capita GDP in Denmark but 147.8 percent per capita GDP in Malawi. As for 
the minimum capital requirement, 20 countries do not impose any such requirement with 0 
percent recorded, whilst we find the highest of 1221 percent of per capita GDP in Ethiopia. 
Overall, for an entrepreneur, formal market entry is burdensome, time-consuming, and 
expensive in many countries, especially in developing countries.  
Table 2a also indicates that Strength of getting credit varies from the lowest of 2 in Jordan to 
the highest of 10 in six countries including the United Kingdom. Depth varies from the 
lowest of 0 in five countries to the highest of 6 in the United Kingdom. In some countries, the 
public credit registry (Public) is 0 percent of population whereas the highest reporting at 70.8 
percent is observed in Portugal.  For the private credit registry (Private), we also observe 0 
percent of population in a third of countries whereas 100 percent is reported in Norway, 
Ireland, and Canada. 
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Overall, competition among industries varies across countries, and generally in advanced 
economies tends to be more intensive than in emerging economies. Furthermore, advanced 
economies regulate entry requirements relatively less than emerging market countries do. 
Figure 1 displays trends of entry regulations, access to finance, and industry competition for 
64 countries under our study over 2004–10. We observe that entry regulations have a 
downward slope, but access to finance has an upward slope over time. In Figure 1(c), it 
appears that the PCM and AFS decrease in line with the relaxation of entry regulations and 
the improvement of access to finance, though this relationship is disrupted by the financial 
crisis.      
The correlation between PCM and AFS is 0.261 and statistically significant at 1 percent. We 
plot both variables in Figure 2 country-wise and industry-wise, respectively, as well as by 
country and industry. As demonstrated, all plots show an upward trend, implying a positive 
association between the two measures of competition. This is expected if both measures are 
plausible proxies of competition.    
V.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
A.   Baseline 
We report the results on the relationship between business regulations and industry 
competition in Tables 3a and 3b. The two tables use the same measures of regulation 
(Starting business and Access finance) but differ in the measure of competition: Table 3a 
shows the results with PCM as the dependent variable, while in Table 3b shows with AFS.  
Note that country-time fixed effects are specified in Columns 1 and 3 whereas country-
specific control variables are specified in Columns 2 and 4. The regression results show a 
positive relationship between regulations governing procedures to start a new business and 
PCM and a negative relationship between regulations governing firms’ access to finance and 
PCM. In other words, as starting a business becomes more cumbersome (as indicated by a 
higher value for the index of Starting business), competition declines (as indicated by a 
higher value for PCM or AFS). Similarly, as the regulations relating to getting credit are less 
established (as indicated by a lower value for the index of Access finance), competition 
becomes less intense.  
These estimates are not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. For 
instance, concentrating on Column 1 in Table 3a, the coefficient estimate on the interaction 
term of regulation and industry characteristic implies that PCM for an industry at the 75th 
percentile of distribution of entry rate is about 1.65 percent more than the one at the 25th 
percentile of the same distribution when moving from a country with Starting business index 
at the 25th percentile to a country with Starting business index at the 75th percentile. 
Conversely, focusing on Column 3 in Table 3a, PCM for an industry at the 75th percentile of 
distribution of external finance dependence is about 1.67 percent less than the one at the 25th 
percentile of the same distribution when moving from a country with Access finance index at 
the 25th percentile to a country with Access finance index at the 75th percentile. These 
impacts are economically not trivial, given that the sample mean for the PCM is 11.8 percent. 
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One relevant question is which set of regulations, market entry or credit access, matter more. 
Note that the coefficient estimates in the regressions including country-level controls in 
Columns 2 and 4 rather than country-time fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3 are very close in 
magnitude. This suggests that both market-entry and credit-access regulations matter 
because, in the specification with country-time fixed effects, the set of regulations other than 
the one of interest (Starting business or Access finance) is controlled for. In order to answer 
the question more directly, we also include the interaction terms for both Starting business 
and Access finance in the same specification. The results in Table 4 indicate that there is no 
obvious winner in this horse race: coefficients on both interaction terms remain statistically 
significant and similar in magnitude to those obtained in Tables 3a and 3b. 
Overall, we observe that rigid entry regulations and poor access to credit are associated with 
reduced competition among industrial sectors, whereas the relaxation of regulations and 
better access to finance tend to promote competition. The magnitude of these relationships is 
economically meaningful. This is consistent with experiences in some countries, for instance, 
the average PCM in Azerbaijan—a resource-rich developing country—substantially 
decreased from 13 percent in 2004 to 4 percent in 2010. This was accompanied by a sharp 
fall (increase) in the index of Starting business (Access finance), which declined (increased) 
from 2.4 (-1.7) to -1.1 (-0.3) over the same period.   
B.   Robustness to Alternative Measures 
In Table 5, we confirm the robustness of our results to alternative measures of the main 
variables, namely, the business regulation indices and industry competition measure.  
In Columns 1–2 and 4–5, we specify alternative measures for business start-up entry 
regulations and access to finance. For entry regulations, we utilize data for the ‘registering 
property’ and ‘dealing with construction’ categories of the ‘Doing Business’ database to 
augment the measure we use in the baseline.17 The results continue to show that competition 
may be hindered by the complexity of procedures and high cost of transactions. As 
alternative measure for access to finance, we utilize the ‘enforcing contracts’ category to 
augment the original measure of Access finance. The results are comparable to those obtained 
in Tables 3a and 3b.  
In Columns 3 and 6, we re-define AFS by using the ratio of total value added to the number 
of establishments (in log), instead of the ratio of the number of employees to the number of 
establishments. The results for Starting business are consistent with those in Tables 3a and 
3b, where the coefficients of the interaction term for Starting business are highly significant 
with a positive sign. Entry regulations appear to protect the incumbents, whilst dampening 
the creation of new firms, contributing to an anti-competitive environment in manufacturing 
sectors.  In terms of Access finance, the coefficient remains significant and negative. This 
again suggests that protection laws reduce PCM and hence boost competition.  
                                                 
17 More specifically, for this augmentation, we compute the first principal component for the four aspects of 
“starting business” (as in the original measure) and the procedure and time aspects of two new dimensions— 
“registering property” and “dealing with construction”—of entry regulations. 
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These robustness results indeed support our initial main findings in Table 3 and are in line 
with earlier empirical literature. For example, Desai et al. (2003) find that entry regulations 
have a negative impact on firm entry based on a cross-country approach. Scarpetta et al. 
(2002) also find that stringent product and labor market regulations are negatively correlated 
with the entry of small and medium-sized firms in OECD countries using firm-level survey 
data. In Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007), countries where it takes more time to register new 
businesses witness slower establishment growth in industries that experience expansionary 
global demand and technology shifts.  The results also accord with that reported in Klapper et 
al. (2006), who find that entry is higher amongst more financially dependent industries in 
countries that have higher financial development.              
C.   Direction of Causality 
Based on the analysis so far, we know that the findings are not driven by the possibility that 
there are fewer high-entry industries in countries with high bureaucratic entry barriers or that 
there are fewer external-finance-dependent industries in countries with poor access to credit. 
This is because we are able to control for industry effects in our dataset composed of 
industry-country-time observations. Yet, there is the possibility that there are omitted 
variables that might jointly drive the propensity to enter or the tendency to be external 
finance dependent and the degree to which regulations raise barriers for market entry or for 
access to finance.  
To address concerns about the direction of causality, we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach using the two-stage least squares method. The literature has shown that the origin 
of a country’s legal system appears to be strongly correlated with the regulatory framework 
in place today (see, among others, La Porta et al., 1999). In addition, institutional quality of a 
country can be associated with the effectiveness of regulations. A lack of quality government 
institutions can hamper not only entrepreneurial activities (Nyström, 2008) but also efficient 
allocation of resources. Therefore, we use the legal origin and KKZ index as instruments for 
regulation.18 The results of this exercise are shown in Table 6a. Note that the magnitudes of 
the coefficients are larger as compared with those in Tables 3a and 3b. This suggests a higher 
sensitivity of industry competition to business regulations in the IV model, potentially 
explained by different groups of countries or industries being differentially affected by the 
instrument.  Nevertheless, the results remain fairly robust in terms of sign and significance 
level. Only the association between Access finance and PCM is no longer significant (and the 
diagnostic tests seem to suggest that we cannot rule out the possibility that the variables in 
this specification are exogenous).  
The instrumental variable approach may still not fully address the causality problem. It could 
be that countries with industries of a certain characteristic have a strong entrepreneurial 
culture and, hence, select business-friendly and transparent regulations. If legal origin also 
drives culture, it would be exogenous but still correlated with other omitted variables that 
                                                 
18 Note that legal origin does not change over time while regulations do. Hence, to construct a time-varying 
instrument for regulations, we interact legal origin with the KKZ index, which measures six different 
dimensions of governance: government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice 
and accountability, and control of corruption. 
17 
 
determine competition. In technical terms, the instrument may be violating the exclusion 
restriction.  
A crude way to address this is to specify the interaction between the industry characteristic 
and a country’s average value for that characteristic. If the country’s average characteristic is 
a proxy for culture, the inclusion of this new interaction term should not materially change 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the interaction term of interest. The results in 
Table 6b confirm that it does not (by comparing the coefficients to their counterparts in 
Tables 3a and 3b).   
Another way to check the direction of causality is to see if the results hold when we restrict 
the sample to industries that are less likely to be able to affect regulations. One could 
reasonably expect that relatively small industries (defined here with respect to the median 
level of value added) or those in low-growth (defined here as those with average value-added 
growth rate below median) or in low-tech (defined based on OECD classification) industries 
to have less influence in policymaking. We expect the signs to remain the same and 
significant when one looks only at small industries, low-growth industries, or low-tech 
industries. The results in Table 6c are largely in line with this expectation. 
Another source of omitted variable bias is the interaction between the macroeconomic 
environment and industry conditions. While the use of country-time fixed effects allows us to 
control for any macroeconomic shocks directly affecting sectoral outcomes, it could be the 
case that some macroeconomic variables correlated with entry regulation affect sectoral 
outcomes through the industry characteristic (i.e. natural entry rate or external financial 
dependence). We check the robustness of the results by adding interaction terms between the 
sector specific variables and macroeconomic variables. Specifically, we interact the industry 
characteristic with variables such as financial depth, trade openness, institutional quality, 
cross-border capital, GDP growth, and inflation.19 Table 7a(b) report the results with PCM 
(AFS) as the dependent variable. We find little sign of potential omitted variables and our 
main findings remain intact. 
D.   Channels: A Discussion 
So far we have, in general, found that the indicators of Starting business (Access finance) 
have a negative (positive) relationship with industry competition. In this sub-section, we aim 
to have a discussion on the channels through which these relationships are likely to arise.  
The components of the regulation indices may give indications of the underlying forces. We 
repeat the baseline regressions (as displayed in Tables 3a and 3b) with the components rather 
than the composite indices in Tables 8a and 8b. We observe somewhat mixed results in terms 
of significance level between PCM and AFS regressions.  We focus our discussion on the 
                                                 
19 Financial depth is computed as domestic credit to private sector and market capitalization of listed companies 
as percent of GDP. Trade openness is measured by a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. Cross-border capital is measured as FDI in 
percent of GDP. Institutional quality is proxied by KKZ index, as before. The data sources for these variables 
are the World Bank WDI, Heritage Foundation, and Worldwide Governance Indicator. 
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coefficients that are significant at least at the 10 percent level for both regressions.  For 
market-entry regulations, we find that as Procedure and Time increases, PCM and AFS 
increases, implying a decline in competition. Interestingly, the coefficient on Capital is not 
statistically significant. In the case of access-to-finance regulations, Depth indicates a 
statistically significant, negative relationship with PCM and AFS, and hence it is likely to 
promote competition. These results indicate that an increase in the number of procedures and 
time for starting a business becomes the primary hindrance for potential new establishments, 
whereas the provision of initial capital may be of less critical importance. The latter is 
inconsistent with a general belief that lack of credit is the major obstacle for economic 
growth in the finance-growth literature. Our analysis instead highlights that it is the 
complexity of procedures that is likely to exert more adverse impact on new enterprises. Note 
also that the significant coefficient on Depth and insignificant coefficients on the other 
components could be a reflection that a high quality of rules and practices affecting credit 
information availability—as captured by the Depth component—may be contributing to 
higher values in the other components of Access Finance (in particular for the Public and 
Private components, which measure the actual coverage in credit registries/bureaus). This 
interpretation is also consistent with literature on the effects of bank competition on firms’ 
access to finance: for instance, Love and Martinez Peria (2015) find that this impact depends 
on the quality and scope of credit information sharing mechanisms: better credit information 
mitigates the damaging impact on access of low banking competition.  
Stringent entry regulations can lead to higher levels of industry market power through a 
reduction in the number of new firms entering a market (Klapper et al., 2006) or through 
lower investment (Alesina et al., 2005). Thus, we also examine the possible role of extensive 
and intensive margins. The former is measured by the number of establishments and the 
latter by the log of fixed capital formation (investment). If these variables form a channel 
between the competition and regulations, we would expect negative and positive signs on the 
coefficients of Starting business and Access finance, respectively. Even if they may not be a 
valid conduit, we would predict the same sign, if our previous results are credible since an 
increase in establishments and possibly investment at least provides industries with ground 
for competition. The results in Table 8c are as expected for establishments: tighter entry 
regulations reduce the number of establishments whilst better access to finance increase it. 
We do not find statistically significant relationship between investment and Starting business 
though and the sign of the relationship between investment and Access finance is opposite of 
what one would expect if the latter type of regulations increased external-finance-dependent 
incumbents to invest more. Taken together, these results seem to suggest that regulations 
may be promoting competition by allowing firms to expand on the extensive margin rather 
than the intensive margin.      
VI.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we examined the relationship between competition and regulatory indicators 
for starting a business and for access to finance. The main results are supportive of public 
choice theory, that is, bureaucratic market entry barriers can lead to lower levels of 
competition while legal protections and information disclosure for access to finance 
contribute to competitive structures across industries.   
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From a policymaker’s point of view, our results provide a consistent body of evidence 
suggesting that entry barriers may distort industry competition. However, this does not 
necessarily mean a decline in growth, since it is possible that in countries with tougher entry 
regulations, industries may respond to growth opportunities through the expansion of existing 
firms,20 whilst in countries with lighter entry regulations, growth opportunities lead to the 
creation of new firms. The general point made is that entry regulation may carry costs in 
terms of anti-competitive industry structures. And, regulations on access to finance may 
mitigate such detrimental effect. Policymakers should weigh these potential costs of 
regulating market entry and facilitating access to finance on industries, in particular, for high 
entry-rate and external-finance-dependent industries. 
It is worth noting that regulations serve a purpose and are necessary to ensure that market 
failures are adequately addressed and fairness is maintained. Overly bureaucratic and costly 
regulations are more problematic than regulations in and of themselves. Indeed, the indicator 
of Starting business we use in our analysis is appropriate to assess the bureaucratic burden. 
Well-designed regulations could thrive to ensure that public health and safety are not 
threatened by industrial activity while keeping the burden on the regulated industries 
reasonable.  
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The difference between sales and variable costs over sales, variable costs being the 




Average firm size (AFS)







The fraction of new firms--defined as a firm that is one or two years old--to total number 
of firms in an industry, computed for U.S. firms   
Klapper et al. (2006)
Financial dependence
Rajan and Zingales' (1998) measure of reliance on external finance, defined as 1 minus 
cash flow over investment of publicly traded U.S. firms 




Index that identifies the bureaucratic and legal hurdles an entrepreneur must overcome 
to incorporate and register a new firm by examining the procedures, time, and cost 
involved in launching a commercial or industrial firm with up to 50 employees and start-
up capital of 10 times the economy’s per-capita gross national income
“Doing Business” 
project, World Bank
   Procedure
Total number of procedures required to register a firm, where a procedure is defined as 
any interaction of the company founders with external parties (for example, government 
agencies, lawyers, auditors or notaries)
“Doing Business” 
project, World Bank
   Time
Total number of days required to register a firm, as captured by the median duration that 
incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary to complete a procedure with minimum 
follow-up with government agencies and no extra payments
“Doing Business” 
project, World Bank
   Cost
Cost required to complete each procedure, including all official fees and fees for legal or 
professional services if such services are required by law and recorded as a 
percentage of the economy’s income per capita
“Doing Business” 
project, World Bank
   Capital 
The amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank or with a notary before 
registration and up to 3 months following incorporation, recorded as a percentage of the 




Index that captures two sets of issues: credit information registries and the effectiveness 
of collateral and bankruptcy laws in facilitating lending
“Doing Business” 
project, World Bank
   Strength
Index that measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights 
of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending
“Doing Business” 
project, World Bank
   Depth
Index that measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope, and accessibility 




   Public
The number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with information on 
their borrowing history from the past 5 years as a % of the total population
“Doing Business” 
project, World Bank
   Private
The number of individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau with information on 
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A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the crisis period 2008-10, and 0 
otherwise
Own calculation.
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Average (firm) size II













Note: UNIDO reports nominal data in U.S. dollars. Nominal value added and output deflated using U.S. producer price index of finished 





Table 2a. Industry competition and entry regulations by country   
Industry competition Starting business Access finance
Code Country PCM AFS Procedure Time Cost (%) Capital (%) Strength Depth Public (%) Private (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1 Albania ALB 0.116 2.256 9.29 30.14 37.93 32.83 9.00 1.33 2.78 0.00
2 Australia AUS 0.047 2.161 2.00 2.00 1.46 0.00 9.00 5.00 0.00 99.23
3 Austria AUT 0.079 3.445 8.00 25.00 5.57 58.73 7.00 6.00 1.25 40.88
4 Azerbaijan AZE 0.071 3.988 11.00 63.71 9.40 0.00 6.00 3.67 2.15 0.00
5 Belgium BEL 0.077 3.057 4.00 23.29 7.87 21.63 6.00 4.00 56.03 0.00
6 Brazil BRA 0.267 3.923 16.00 146.00 10.04 0.00 3.00 5.00 15.88 51.15
7 Bulgaria BGR 0.099 3.156 8.43 32.43 7.19 61.43 8.00 5.00 21.08 2.84
8 Canada CAN 0.146 3.045 1.71 3.57 0.69 0.00 7.00 6.00 0.00 100.00
9 Chile CHL 0.214 4.364 9.00 27.00 9.31 0.00 4.00 5.00 28.90 27.55
10 Colombia COL 0.337 4.030 11.71 40.71 20.57 0.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 38.82
11 Cyprus CYP 0.074 1.901 6.00 8.00 12.90 0.00 9.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 Denmark DNK -0.002 2.991 4.29 6.29 0.00 44.23 8.67 4.00 0.00 8.00
13 Ecuador ECU 0.217 4.524 13.86 73.14 38.36 8.17 3.00 4.83 25.67 30.10
14 Estonia EST 0.070 3.163 5.57 33.57 4.60 36.20 6.00 5.00 0.00 16.85
15 Ethiopia ETH 0.238 4.729 9.14 26.14 144.39 1221.13 4.00 1.33 0.07 0.00
16 Finland FIN 0.070 2.868 3.00 16.43 1.07 19.50 8.00 4.00 0.00 14.80
17 France FRA 0.047 3.099 5.43 11.86 1.10 4.17 5.83 4.00 17.82 0.00
18 Georgia GEO 0.087 2.732 6.29 14.86 11.20 23.94 5.33 3.17 0.00 2.82
19 Germany DEU 0.030 3.809 9.00 27.43 5.37 39.53 7.67 6.00 0.65 93.75
20 Hungary HUN 0.090 3.010 5.43 29.29 20.10 60.39 7.00 5.00 0.00 6.73
21 India IND 0.135 4.226 11.86 53.86 64.87 314.91 7.17 3.50 0.00 6.55
22 Indonesia IDN 0.287 5.261 11.57 115.71 91.07 56.40 3.00 2.83 12.90 0.08
23 Iran IRN 0.187 4.386 8.14 25.57 5.61 1.53 4.00 2.83 20.52 0.00
24 Ireland IRL 0.094 3.634 4.00 15.14 3.89 0.00 9.00 5.00 0.00 100.00
25 Israel ISR -0.010 2.853 5.00 20.00 4.91 0.00 9.00 4.67 0.00 93.10
26 Italy ITA 0.078 2.419 8.14 13.57 19.90 10.46 3.00 5.33 9.82 68.12
27 Japan JPN 0.227 3.362 9.29 26.43 8.86 32.16 6.83 6.00 0.00 68.68
28 Jordan JOR 0.242 2.882 9.43 25.00 61.13 719.87 2.00 2.00 0.77 0.00
29 Korea KOR 0.243 3.207 9.71 16.57 16.67 264.73 8.00 5.33 0.00 83.14
30 Kuwait KWT 0.076 4.193 13.00 35.00 1.73 110.34 4.00 3.50 0.00 20.82
31 Kyrgyz Republic KGZ 0.124 3.537 7.43 18.71 9.50 0.47 7.17 2.67 0.00 1.97
32 Latvia LVA 0.097 2.968 5.00 16.00 4.93 28.20 10.00 3.67 9.37 0.00
33 Lithuania LTU 0.066 3.377 7.43 26.00 3.13 50.01 5.00 5.50 6.45 10.44
34 Luxembourg LUX 0.020 3.238 6.00 25.50 7.75 21.10 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
35 Macedonia MKD 0.034 2.682 9.86 27.14 7.90 58.50 7.00 3.33 7.20 0.00
36 Malawi MWI 0.070 5.417 10.00 39.86 147.84 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
37 Malaysia MYS 0.101 4.081 10.00 31.00 24.91 0.00 10.00 6.00 42.62 82.00









Table 2a continued …
39 Mexico MEX 0.205 5.138 8.57 38.43 14.51 12.83 5.00 6.00 0.00 61.10
40 Moldova MDA 0.181 4.426 9.57 25.71 14.06 19.51 8.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
41 Mongolia MNG 0.091 2.519 7.14 14.00 8.53 119.06 6.00 3.00 12.15 0.00
42 Morocco MAR 0.104 4.124 6.71 15.43 17.59 326.60 3.00 1.83 1.60 2.33
43 Netherlands NLD 0.066 2.937 6.43 8.43 9.17 59.19 6.00 5.00 0.00 75.23
44 New Zealand NZL 0.043 2.626 1.71 8.86 0.24 0.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 98.93
45 Norway NOR 0.024 2.646 4.86 10.29 2.56 24.84 6.00 4.00 0.00 100.00
46 Oman OMN 0.265 4.465 8.86 28.71 4.17 546.31 4.00 2.00 17.58 0.00
47 Peru PER 0.121 7.068 9.86 78.29 31.30 0.00 5.67 6.00 19.20 30.25
48 Poland POL 0.137 2.990 9.43 31.14 20.47 184.39 8.17 4.83 0.00 47.33
49 Portugal PRT 0.079 2.528 8.57 33.86 9.53 37.21 3.00 5.00 70.80 10.97
50 Qatar QAT 0.279 3.712 6.75 6.75 9.20 99.25 4.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
51 Romania ROM 0.039 3.358 5.14 15.14 5.54 1.73 8.50 4.83 3.12 12.05
52 Russia RUS 0.123 3.723 8.86 31.71 5.54 3.91 3.00 2.17 0.00 4.78
53 Singapore SGP 0.056 3.584 5.43 5.71 0.84 0.00 10.00 3.00 0.00 40.33
54 Slovak Republic SVK 0.058 4.091 8.29 38.86 4.91 37.83 9.00 3.50 1.02 37.52
55 Slovenia SVN 0.000 2.923 7.57 46.43 8.33 35.69 4.67 3.17 2.67 0.00
56 South Africa ZAF 0.089 2.780 8.00 31.57 7.66 0.00 10.00 5.50 0.00 58.60
57 Spain ESP 0.071 2.817 10.00 66.14 15.93 14.96 6.00 5.00 43.73 7.40
58 Sri Lanka LKA 0.284 4.768 6.86 46.57 20.46 0.00 3.33 4.17 0.00 5.52
59 Sweden SWE 0.078 2.572 3.00 16.00 0.66 33.43 7.00 4.00 0.00 99.67
60 Tanzania TZA 0.214 4.361 10.57 27.00 116.14 0.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
61 Turkey TUR 0.080 2.489 7.00 10.57 23.79 18.97 4.00 5.00 8.95 30.76
62 United Kingdom GBR 0.071 3.163 6.00 13.00 0.80 0.00 10.00 6.00 0.00 89.38
63 Uruguay URY 0.145 . 10.86 47.29 45.30 129.94 4.00 5.50 12.20 88.32
64 Vietnam VNM 0.072 4.711 11.14 45.29 23.50 0.00 7.00 3.17 7.70 0.00
28 
 
Table 2b . Industry competition and industry characteristics by industry    
Industry competition Industry characteristics
PCM AFS Entry rate Financial dep.
ISIC Industry (1) (2) (3) (4)
311 Food products 0.113 3.371 5.24 0.14
313 Beverages 0.213 3.812 5.24 0.08
314 Tobacco 0.265 5.260 7.45 -0.45
321 Textiles 0.073 3.318 6.92 0.4
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.079 3.070 6.44 0.03
323 Leather and fur products 0.060 2.782 7.75 -0.14
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 0.074 3.238 9.06 -0.08
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.109 2.720 5.98 0.28
332 Furniture and fixtures, excel. metal 0.083 2.780 7.92 0.24
341 Paper products 0.117 3.753 5.26 0.18
342 Printing and publishing 0.107 2.611 5.49 0.2
351 Industrial chemicals 0.153 4.167 5.94 0.25
352 Other chemical product 0.176 3.860 6.08 0.22
353 Petroleum refineries 0.178 5.055 5.8 0.04
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.138 4.225 5.8 0.33
355 Rubber products 0.101 3.648 4.46 0.23
356 Plastic products 0.113 3.439 4.46 1.14
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0.085 2.996 5.79 -0.15
362 Glass and products 0.137 3.604 5.79 0.53
369 Other non-metalic mineral products 0.157 3.107 5.79 0.06
371 Iron and steel 0.129 4.422 4.9 0.09
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.132 4.096 4.9 0.01
381 Fabricated metal products 0.105 2.913 5.71 0.24
382 Non-electrical machinery 0.110 3.394 6.49 0.45
383  Electrical machinery 0.089 3.694 5.71 0.77
384 Transport equipment 0.079 4.080 6.58 0.31
385 Professional and scientific equipment 0.120 3.120 5.72 0.96










































Table 2c: Summary statistics of all variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Industry competition
Price-cost margin (PCM) 9114 0.118 0.143 -0.996 0.930
Average firm size (AFS) 8996 3.489 1.313 -3.152 9.675
Industry characteristics
Entry rate 27 6.020 1.040 4.460 9.060
Financial dependence 28 0.240 0.320 -0.450 1.140
Starting business 
   Index 437 -0.045 1.398 -2.249 9.088
   Procedure 437 7.819 3.207 1.000 19.000
   Time 437 30.796 28.395 1.000 168.000
   Cost (%) 437 19.948 38.959 0.000 483.900
   Capital (%) 437 79.365 218.420 0.000 1964.200
Access finance
   Index 353 0.037 1.301 -2.272 2.745
   Strength 375 6.309 2.261 2.000 10.000
   Depth 374 3.939 1.816 0.000 6.000
   Public (%) 365 7.918 15.147 0.000 81.300
   Private (%) 353 30.862 36.532 0.000 100.000
Controls
Share 9949 0.041 0.059 -0.030 0.688
Inefficiency 9153 0.214 0.121 0.017 0.618
Productivity (*10000) 8738 0.014 7.548 -49.374 39.692
Concentration 404 0.627 0.136 0.421 0.928
Foreign Investment (%) 448 13.970 48.533 -35.693 504.277
GDP Grow th (%) 447 4.210 4.418 -8.539 18.600
Inflation (%) 442 4.922 4.421 -1.088 24.524
Crisis 448 0.429 0.495 0.000 1.000
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Table 3. Entry regulations and industry competition  
This table reports the results estimating 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡       
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑3𝑌𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + ∅𝑐 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 
 
where 𝑖, 𝑐 and 𝑡 denote industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is industry competition measured as price-cost margin (PCM) or average 
firm size (AFS). 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a vector of entry regulations (starting business / access finance) indices. 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is a proxy for entry rate 
(in the case of starting business) or a proxy of external financial dependence (in the case of access finance) of each industry. 𝑋 is a vector of 
industry-country-year control variables.  𝑌 is a vector of country-year control variables. Table 1 describes the variables in detail. 𝜃𝑖, ∅𝑐, 𝜗𝑡 ,  
𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐, 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡, and ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 denote the dummies for industry, country, year, industry*country, industry*year, and country*year, respectively. 
Regressions are estimated using OLS. The statistical inferences are based on robust standard errors (associated t-values reported in parentheses). 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Our sample includes 28 industries with three-digit ISIC, 
Rev.2 for 64 countries over 2004-2010. Sample size varies across regression specifications because not all variables are available for all 
industries, all countries or all years. 
 
3a: PCM 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.025** -0.023** 
[3.09] [2.87] [-2.22] [-2.03]   
Shareict-1 0.256*** 0.220*** 0.304*** 0.274***
[3.54] [3.17] [4.12] [3.63]   
Inefficiencyict-1 -0.197*** -0.237*** -0.227*** -0.252***
[-3.67] [-4.69] [-3.92] [-4.60]   
Productivityict-1 1.704 0.875 1.047 1.046   
[0.62] [0.29] [0.34] [0.31]   
Controlsct Excluded Included Excluded Included
(Regulation, Foreign Investment, GDP Growth, Inflation)
Constant 0.086*** 0.155*** 0.117*** 0.150***
[3.84] [5.03] [5.96] [4.47]   
N Y N Y
N Y N Y
N Y N Y
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y N Y N
# Countries 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 28 28
N 6612 6533 6189 6106   
Adj. R
2 0.798 0.777 0.787 0.765   


























(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.018** 0.022*** -0.249*** -0.253***
[2.23] [2.63] [-4.06] [-3.99]   
Shareict-1 1.229*** 1.272*** 1.276*** 1.344***
[4.03] [4.08] [3.59] [3.75]   
Inefficiencyict-1 -0.065 -0.249* -0.023 -0.190   
[-0.40] [-1.77] [-0.12] [-1.16]   
Productivityict-1 -0.312 0.476 -1.318 1.876   
[-0.04] [0.06] [-0.15] [0.21]   
Controlsct Excluded Included Excluded Included
(Regulation, Foreign Investment, GDP Growth, Inflation)
Constant 0.626*** 0.739*** 0.645*** 0.744***
[6.79] [5.46] [6.91] [5.01]   
N Y N Y
N Y N Y
N Y N Y
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y N Y N
# Countries 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 28 28
N 6369 6290 5925 5842   
Adj. R
2 0.963 0.960 0.963 0.961   








































Table 4. Entry regulations and industry competition  
This table reports the results estimating 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡       
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑3𝑌𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + ∅𝑐 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 
 
where 𝑖, 𝑐 and 𝑡 denote industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is industry competition measured as price-cost margin (PCM) or average 
firm size (AFS). 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a vector of entry regulations (starting business / access finance) indices. 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is a proxy for entry rate 
(in the case of starting business) or a proxy of external financial dependence (in the case of access finance) of each industry. 𝑋 is a vector of 
industry-country-year control variables. 𝑌 is a vector of country-year control variables. Table 1 describes the variables in detail. 𝜃𝑖, ∅𝑐, 𝜗𝑡,  
𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐, 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡, and ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 denote the dummies for industry, country, year, industry*country, industry*year, and country*year, respectively. 
Regressions are estimated using OLS. The statistical inferences are based on robust standard errors (associated t-values reported in parentheses). 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Our sample includes 28 industries with three-digit ISIC, 
Rev.2 for 64 countries over 2004-2010. Sample size varies across regression specifications because not all variables are available for all 
industries, all countries or all years. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting_Businessct × Characteristici 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.023** 0.027***
[2.99] [2.79] [2.40] [2.81]   
Access_Financect × Characteristici -0.022** -0.021* -0.256*** -0.261***
[-2.10] [-1.92] [-4.10] [-4.07]   
Shareict-1 0.296*** 0.260*** 1.199*** 1.249***
[4.11] [3.56] [3.42] [3.49]   
Inefficiencyict-1 -0.194*** -0.240*** -0.105 -0.291*  
[-3.36] [-4.43] [-0.54] [-1.80]   
Productivityict-1 0.352 0.226 -2.419 0.972   
[0.11] [0.07] [-0.27] [0.11]   
Controlsct Excluded Included Excluded Included
(Regulation, Foreign Investment, GDP Growth, Inflation)
Constant 0.079*** 0.156*** 0.558*** 0.797***
[3.43] [4.59] [5.51] [5.27]   
N Y N Y
N Y N Y
N Y N Y
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y N Y N
# Countries 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 27 27
N 5972 5893 5725 5646   
Adj. R












Table 5. Entry regulations and industry competition: Robustness to alternative measures of the main variables 
This table reports the results estimating 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + +𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡      
 
where 𝑖, 𝑐 and 𝑡 denote industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is industry competition measured as price-cost margin (PCM) or average 
firm size (AFS). 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a vector of entry regulations (starting business / access finance) indices. 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is a proxy for entry rate 
(in the case of starting business) or a proxy of external financial dependence (in the case of access finance) of each industry. 𝑋 is a vector of 
industry-country-year control variables.  𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 , 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 , and ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡  denote the dummies for industry*country, industry*year, and 
country*year, respectively. Regressions are estimated using OLS. The statistical inferences are based on robust standard errors (associated t-
values reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Our sample includes 28 
industries with three-digit ISIC, Rev.2 for 64 countries over 2004-2010. Sample size varies across regression specifications because not all 
variables are available for all industries, all countries or all years. 
 
PCM AFS PCM AFS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.007*** 0.022** 0.036** -0.037** -0.296*** -0.306***
[2.86] [2.06] [2.46]   [-2.49] [-3.56] [-4.43]   
Share 0.170** 1.251*** 3.261*** 0.311*** 1.316*** 3.450***
[2.04] [3.34] [5.81]   [4.16] [3.63] [5.42]   
Inefficiency -0.163*** -0.002 -0.616** -0.227*** -0.019 -0.425   
[-2.63] [-0.01] [-2.36]   [-3.91] [-0.10] [-1.49]   
Productivity 0.826 -0.018 16.810   1.019 -1.350 16.548   
[0.28] [-0.00] [1.03]   [0.33] [-0.15] [0.89]   
Constant 0.052* 0.541*** 8.850*** 0.116*** 0.648*** 8.913***
[1.78] [3.56] [56.60]   [5.92] [6.95] [59.00]   
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Countries 64 64 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 28 28 28 28
N 5376 5176 6387   6189 5925 5947   
Adj. R
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Table 6. Entry regulations and industry competition: Robustness to addressing causality and selection issues 
This table reports the results estimating 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡       
 
where 𝑖, 𝑐 and 𝑡 denote industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is industry competition measured as price-cost margin (PCM) or average 
firm size (AFS). 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a vector of entry regulations (starting business / access finance) indices. 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is a proxy for entry rate 
(in the case of starting business) or a proxy of external financial dependence (in the case of access finance) of each industry. 𝑋 is a vector of 
industry-country-year control variables.  Table 1 describes the variables in detail. 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐, 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 , and ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡  denote the dummies for 
industry*country, industry*year, and country*year, respectively. Regressions are estimated using IV in 6a and OLS in 6b and 6c. The statistical 
inferences are based on robust standard errors (associated t-values reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Our sample includes 28 industries with three-digit ISIC, Rev.2 for 64 countries over 2004-2010. Sample 
size varies across regression specifications because not all variables are available for all industries, all countries or all years. 
 
6a: IV 
IV: (legal origin, KKZ)*Characteristic PCM AFS PCM AFS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.034*** 0.122*** -0.058 -0.575***
[3.95] [2.78] [-1.45] [-2.63]   
Share 0.227*** 1.122*** 0.314*** 1.356***
[3.75] [4.42] [5.04] [4.50]   
Inefficiency -0.203*** -0.100 -0.225*** 0.002   
[-4.42] [-0.71] [-4.67] [0.02]   
Productivity 1.323 -2.065 0.979 -2.239   
[0.57] [-0.30] [0.38] [-0.30]   
Constant 0.327*** 1.274*** 0.108*** 0.528***
[5.73] [4.43] [5.75] [4.89]   
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
# Countries 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 28 28
N 6612 6369 6189 5925   
Adj. R
2 0.790 0.961 0.786 0.963   
Test of endogeneity
   Robust score X^2 (p-value) 0.05 0.02 0.35 0.10
   Robust regression F (p-value) 0.00 0.04 0.44 0.17
First stage regression
   R
2 0.998 0.998 0.976 0.977
   Adj. R
2 0.997 0.997 0.966 0.967
Test of overidentifying restrictions
   Score X^2 (p-value) 0.30 0.00 0.72 0.00























6b: Additional interaction terms with country-level variables 
Additional interaction terms with country-level variables PCM AFS PCM AFS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.007*** 0.020** -0.025** -0.248***
[2.84] [2.34] [-2.23] [-4.01]   
Country_average_characct × Characteristici 0.050*** -0.155 0.420* 1.693** 
[3.52] [-1.38] [1.93] [2.23]   
Share 0.223*** 1.337*** 0.297*** 1.249***
[3.11] [4.27] [4.09] [3.55]   
Inefficiency -0.199*** -0.057 -0.230*** -0.027   
[-3.70] [-0.35] [-3.97] [-0.14]   
Productivity 1.870 -0.903 0.980 -1.492   
[0.69] [-0.11] [0.32] [-0.17]   
Constant -1.499*** 5.555 0.106*** 0.599***
[-3.34] [1.56] [5.06] [6.25]   
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
# Countries 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 28 28
N 6612 6369 6189 5925   
Adj. R
2 0.799 0.963 0.787 0.964   








































Subsamples PCM AFS PCM AFS PCM AFS PCM AFS PCM AFS PCM AFS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.006* 0.003 0.005* 0.031** 0.006*** 0.009 -0.037** -0.206*** -0.006 -0.750*** -0.012 -0.130*
[1.65] [0.30] [1.72] [2.28]   [2.67] [1.28] [-2.07] [-2.62] [-0.25] [-5.34]   [-1.04] [-1.93]
Share 0.096 0.660 0.608*** 2.186*** 0.270*** 0.476 0.145 0.624 0.618*** 2.566*** 0.262*** 0.515
[0.80] [1.53] [5.41] [4.37]   [3.12] [1.39] [1.22] [1.39] [4.67] [4.43]   [2.96] [1.40]
Inefficiency -0.171*** 0.131 -0.223*** 0.015   -0.186*** 0.039 -0.167** 0.122 -0.291*** 0.090   -0.226*** 0.085
[-2.64] [0.68] [-4.06] [0.05]   [-3.74] [0.23] [-2.46] [0.53] [-2.76] [0.22]   [-3.57] [0.40]
Productivity 1.063 -4.774 15.300*** 16.160   -0.648 -6.763 0.321 -8.198 12.158*** 10.157   0.145 -9.898
[0.39] [-0.72] [4.44] [0.90]   [-0.19] [-0.75] [0.10] [-1.09] [3.30] [0.48]   [0.04] [-1.05]
Constant 0.132*** 0.794*** 0.042 0.464* 0.096*** 0.687*** 0.160*** 0.781*** 0.066* 0.309 0.130*** 0.685***
[4.21] [7.42] [1.26] [1.75] [4.39] [6.98]   [5.52] [7.37] [1.80] [1.18] [6.68] [6.68]   
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 28 28 28 28 28
N 3123 3100 3454 3305 4558 4388   2918 2893 3232 3072 4331 4142   
Adj. R
2 0.706 0.968 0.871 0.962 0.848 0.976   0.694 0.969 0.859 0.964 0.837 0.976   


































Table 7. Entry regulations and industry competition: Robustness to addressing omitted variables concern 
This table reports the results estimating 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + +𝜑3𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡       
 
where 𝑖, 𝑐 and 𝑡 denote industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is industry competition measured as price-cost margin (PCM) or average firm size (AFS. 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a vector of entry 
regulations (starting business / access finance) variables. 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is a proxy for entry rate (in the case of starting business) or a proxy of external financial dependence (in the case of access 
finance) of each industry. 𝑋 is a vector of industry-country-year control variables.  𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 is a vector of country-year macro variables. Table 1 describes the variables in detail.  𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐, 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡, and 
∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 denote the dummies for industry*country, industry*year, and country*year, respectively. Regressions are estimated using OLS. The statistical inferences are based on robust standard errors 
(associated t-values reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Our sample includes 28 industries with three-digit ISIC, Rev.2 for 
64 countries over 2004-2010. Sample size varies across regression specifications because not all variables are available for all industries, all countries or all years. 
 
7a: PCM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.026** -0.024** -0.020* -0.025** -0.024** -0.024** -0.020*  
[3.14] [3.11] [3.09] [3.14]   [3.10] [3.14] [3.27]   [-2.38] [-2.19] [-1.94] [-2.25]   [-2.19] [-2.18] [-1.86]   
Share 0.260*** 0.255*** 0.258*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.260*** 0.266*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.311*** 0.305*** 0.304*** 0.309*** 0.318***
[3.55] [3.54] [3.48] [3.54]   [3.54] [3.59] [3.56]   [4.11] [4.12] [4.21] [4.12]   [4.12] [4.17] [4.27]   
Inefficiency -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.196*** -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.224*** -0.227*** -0.228*** -0.228*** -0.224***
[-3.67] [-3.67] [-3.66] [-3.67]   [-3.66] [-3.67] [-3.66]   [-3.93] [-3.92] [-3.90] [-3.91]   [-3.93] [-3.93] [-3.88]   
Productivity 1.717 1.696 1.711 1.704   1.700 1.765 1.781   1.069 1.046 1.036 1.046   1.054 1.012 1.021   
[0.63] [0.62] [0.63] [0.62]   [0.62] [0.65] [0.65]   [0.35] [0.34] [0.34] [0.34]   [0.34] [0.33] [0.33]   
Financial dev. × Characteristic -0.000                -0.000 0.0002                0.000*  
[-1.04]                [-1.12] [1.44]                [1.75]   
Trade freedom × Characteristic 0.0001                 0.0001 -0.000                -0.0001   
[0.59]                 [0.77] [-0.03]                [-0.17]   
Institutions × Characteristic -0.002                 -0.002 -0.057                -0.077   
[-0.23]                 [-0.27] [-0.94]                [-1.21]   
FDI × Characteristic -0.000   -0.000 -0.0004   -0.001   
[-0.06]   [-0.09] [-0.78]   [-1.17]   
GDP growth × Characteristic 0.000 0.000   0.001 0.001   
[0.09] [0.10]   [0.46] [0.93]   
Inflation × Characteristic -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.001   
[-1.03] [-1.14] [-0.28] [-0.39]   
Constant 0.087*** 0.054 0.080** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.091*** 0.045 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.111***
[3.89] [0.93] [2.43] [3.82]   [3.41] [3.89] [0.68] [5.94] [5.69] [5.56] [5.94]   [5.95] [5.97] [5.20]   
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
N 6612 6612 6612 6612   6612 6533 6533 6189 6189 6189 6189   6189 6106 6106   
Adj. R
2 0.798 0.798 0.798 0.798   0.798 0.796 0.796 0.787 0.786 0.787 0.787   0.787 0.784 0.784   





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.011 0.016** 0.020** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.007   -0.234*** -0.240*** -0.265*** -0.253*** -0.254*** -0.250*** -0.257***
[1.33] [1.97] [2.46] [2.20]   [2.22] [2.23] [0.81]   [-3.88] [-3.84] [-4.17] [-4.14]   [-4.11] [-4.08] [-3.98]   
Share 0.980*** 1.236*** 1.051*** 1.229*** 1.230*** 1.247*** 0.966*** 1.279*** 1.279*** 1.261*** 1.280*** 1.279*** 1.298*** 1.285***
[3.42] [4.05] [3.60] [4.03]   [4.03] [4.06] [3.31]   [3.58] [3.60] [3.57] [3.60]   [3.60] [3.62] [3.59]   
Inefficiency -0.037 -0.063 -0.072 -0.065   -0.064 -0.064 -0.035   -0.017 -0.025 -0.034 -0.018   -0.017 -0.022 -0.023   
[-0.23] [-0.39] [-0.44] [-0.40]   [-0.39] [-0.39] [-0.22]   [-0.09] [-0.13] [-0.18] [-0.10]   [-0.09] [-0.11] [-0.12]   
Productivity -0.522 -0.245 -0.721 -0.312   -0.343 -0.302 -0.709   -1.436 -1.394 -1.284 -1.314   -1.422 -1.420 -1.609   
[-0.07] [-0.03] [-0.09] [-0.04]   [-0.04] [-0.04] [-0.09]   [-0.16] [-0.16] [-0.15] [-0.15]   [-0.16] [-0.16] [-0.18]   
Financial dev. × Characteristic 0.001***                0.001*** -0.001*                -0.001** 
[5.28]                [4.97]   [-1.92]                [-2.05]   
Trade freedom × Characteristic -0.001                -0.002** -0.003                -0.002   
[-1.30]                [-2.23]   [-1.11]                [-0.79]   
Institutions × Characteristic 0.107***                0.030   0.232                0.330   
[2.81]                [0.81]   [1.03]                [1.41]   
FDI × Characteristic 0.000   0.000   -0.003   -0.002   
[0.04]   [0.53]   [-1.42]   [-0.87]   
GDP growth × Characteristic 0.0002 0.0002   -0.007 -0.007   
[0.20] [0.15]   [-1.26] [-1.23]   
Inflation × Characteristic -0.0002 0.001   -0.001 -0.0001   
[-0.18] [0.70]   [-0.15] [-0.02]   
Constant 0.606*** 0.929*** 0.934*** 0.625*** 0.619*** 0.626*** 1.199*** 0.648*** 0.673*** 0.662*** 0.644*** 0.648*** 0.641*** 0.694***
[6.75] [3.68] [6.69] [6.78]   [6.31] [6.68] [4.31]   [6.93] [7.01] [7.00] [6.89]   [6.93] [6.84] [7.08]   
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
N 6369 6369 6369 6369   6369 6290 6290   5925 5925 5925 5925   5925 5842 5842   
Adj. R
2 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963   0.963 0.962 0.963   0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963   0.963 0.963 0.963   





Table 8. Entry regulations and industry competition: Decomposition of entry regulations variables 
This table reports the results estimating 
 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜑2𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐 + 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 + ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡       
 
where 𝑖, 𝑐 and 𝑡 denote industry 𝑖 in country 𝑐 in year 𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is industry competition measured as price-cost margin (PCM) or average firm size (AFS). Note that the dependent variable in 
Table 8c is log either number of establishment or fixed capital investment. 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a vector of entry regulations (starting business / access finance) variables. 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 is a proxy for entry 
rate (in the case of starting business) or a proxy of external financial dependence (in the case of access finance) of each industry. 𝑋 is a vector of industry-country-year control variables.  𝑌 is a vector of 
country-year control variables. Table 1 describes the variables in detail.  𝜃𝑖 × ∅𝑐, 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜗𝑡 , and ∅𝑐 × 𝜗𝑡 denote the dummies for industry*country, industry*year, and country*year, respectively. 
Regressions are estimated using OLS. The statistical inferences are based on robust standard errors (associated t-values reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Our sample includes 28 industries with three-digit ISIC, Rev.2 for 64 countries over 2004-2010. Sample size varies across regression specifications because not all 
variables are available for all industries, all countries or all years. 
 
8a: PCM 
Procedure Time Cost Capital Strength Depth Public Private 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.002** 0.0003*** 0.0002** -0.000   -0.010 -0.007* 0.001 -0.0004   
[2.20] [2.92] [2.41] [-0.26]   [-1.44] [-1.89] [0.87] [-0.56]   
Share 0.252*** 0.259*** 0.270*** 0.264*** 0.256*** 0.269*** 0.282*** 0.284***
[3.49] [3.55] [3.63] [3.57]   [3.49] [3.72] [3.87] [3.79]   
Inefficiency -0.194*** -0.198*** -0.195*** -0.195*** -0.233*** -0.234*** -0.218*** -0.229***
[-3.63] [-3.69] [-3.64] [-3.63]   [-4.32] [-4.33] [-4.05] [-3.90]   
Productivity 1.732 1.764 1.798 1.816   1.810 1.821 2.441 1.536   
[0.63] [0.65] [0.66] [0.66]   [0.67] [0.67] [0.82] [0.53]   
Constant -0.006 0.065** 0.091*** 0.118*** 0.134*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.123***
[-0.11] [2.40] [4.11] [6.12]   [6.39] [6.20] [6.09] [6.38]   
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 27 27 28 28 28 28
N 6612 6612 6612 6612   6835 6813 6642 6319   
Adj. R
2 0.798 0.798 0.798 0.798   0.790 0.790 0.794 0.786   

















Procedure Time Cost Capital Strength Depth Public Private 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Regulationct × Characteristici 0.006* 0.001*** -0.0002 0.000   -0.217*** -0.066*** -0.004 -0.002   
[1.69] [2.78] [-0.63] [0.30]   [-4.92] [-3.21] [-1.61] [-0.76]   
Share 1.213*** 1.232*** 1.241*** 1.247*** 1.352*** 1.367*** 1.401*** 1.161***
[4.02] [4.01] [4.04] [4.05]   [4.20] [4.34] [4.34] [3.34]   
Inefficiency -0.059 -0.071 -0.058 -0.059   0.022 -0.000 -0.034 -0.028   
[-0.36] [-0.43] [-0.36] [-0.36]   [0.14] [-0.00] [-0.19] [-0.15]   
Productivity -0.246 -0.222 0.019 -0.017   -0.219 0.075 1.465 -2.691   
[-0.03] [-0.03] [0.00] [-0.00]   [-0.03] [0.01] [0.17] [-0.33]   
Constant 0.331 0.534*** 0.732*** 0.702*** 0.958*** 0.683*** 0.679*** 0.705***
[1.39] [5.14] [7.56] [8.14]   [9.11] [7.78] [7.68] [7.76]   
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Countries 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 27 27 27 28 28 28 28
N 6369 6369 6369 6369   6576 6554 6380 6056   
Adj. R
2 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963   0.964 0.964 0.963 0.963   




8c: Channels  
Starting Business Access Finance Starting Business Access Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulationct × Characteristici -0.027*** 0.214*** -0.024 -0.317** 
[-3.26] [4.72] [-0.91] [-2.36]   
Share 0.821*** 0.838*** 1.901** 2.144** 
[3.94] [3.50] [2.24] [2.41]   
Inefficiency 0.210* 0.193* -0.305 -0.047   
[1.85] [1.71] [-0.60] [-0.09]   
Productivity 7.873 10.690 41.905 66.763** 
[1.25] [1.57] [1.59] [2.42]   
Constant 7.424*** 7.345*** 16.154*** 15.945***
[99.72] [105.54] [53.86] [56.09]   
Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y N Y N
# Countries 64 64 64 64
# Industries 27 28 27 28
N 6464 6023 5018 4660   
Adj. R











Figure 1.  Regulations and competition over time 
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Figure 2. Industry competition measures 










































































































































Price-cost margin (PCM) and average firm size (AFS)
(by industry-country)
 
 
 
